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If sceptics did not exist,  
then serious epistemologists  
would have to invent them. 
(L. BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,  





I would like to invite you to take part in a discussion about some forms of 
scepticism in contemporary philosophy which seem to me not only very interesting, 
but also very much right. I will ask you to look at scepticism in general as a positive, 
constructive approach. This runs contrary to many present-day opinions that it is close 
to philosophical nihilism or radical relativism. It opens up many possibilities in 
epistemology (to resolve old problems of obtaining episteme knowledge for example) 
and yet does not lead us to metaphysical dogmatism (which is probably even more 
important). 
 In order to present such a account I will take three steps. Firstly I will have a 
brief look at some points of the history of scepticism which will help us to have 
clearer view of it as an interesting philosophical approach. In the second step I am 
going to give an exact description of scepticism as I see it. To do that I will follow the 
reasoning of Thomas Nagel taken from his excellent book The View from Nowhere 
(Oxford 1986) which has inspired me to begin the research into this area of 
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philosophy. The last step is to present some selected extracts from Paul Horwich’s 
theory of truth to illustrate the possible forms of scepticism as I see them. There is no 
possibility of presenting them in detail and there is in fact no such need. I will rather 
point out some essential features of the theory, those which make it interesting to me. 
I hope it will let us to participate in an interesting discussion no matter what kind of 
philosophical attitude one has. 
 
II.  
1. Scepticism from a historical perspective. 
I hope that all those who are experts in ancient philosophy and the history of 
philosophy will forgive me the very basic remarks here. I will find it necessary 
however to mention some matters in order to distinguish different forms of scepticism 
and to show their historical background. Historically speaking the English word 
‘scepticism’ as well as the Polish word ‘sceptycyzm’ come from the Greek word 
‘skěpsis’ which can be translated as ‘doubt, investigation, consideration’. So, when 
you are calling someone ‘skeptikoi’ – to use the Greek word – you are referring to 
somebody who refuses to take any dogmatic position and claims that he is always 
engaged in ‘considering’ and ‘investigating’ the matters. There are two basic forms of 
scepticism which can be detected among the ancient schools of thought. Firstly 
radical scepticism taken by Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-c.270bc) and secondly moderate 
scepticism taken by Arkesilaos (c.315-c.240bc) and Karneades (c.213-c.129bc), pupils 
from Plato’s Academy.
2
 They all accept the thesis that there cannot be something like 
certain knowledge (episteme) about reality, other minds etc., but they draw quite 
different philosophical conclusions from this. According to Pyrrho we should not 
claim to be able to obtain real knowledge about things. We should rather suspend all 
judgements
3
. According to the scepticism of the Academy, although we can never be 
certain whether we have knowledge and although there is no adequate justification for 
our epistemological claims nevertheless we can agree that it is probable that some of 
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our beliefs are true (or could be true) and hence reliable. We should not call it 
knowledge in the sense of episteme. From what has been said above we can also 
derive two different forms of scepticism 
4
 global and local scepticism, which are very 
widely discussed in the philosophical literature. For my purposes it is enough to say 
that the first one is a scepticism regarding knowledge in general (see Pyrrho’s ideas), 
whereas the second is a scepticism just regarding some particular area of knowledge. 
Let me now make a long jump from antiquity to the seventeenth century and 
concentrate for a while on Descartes’ approach so as to make my considerations 
concerning as such more clear. 
 The most famous questions which are usually numbered among sceptical  
questions are stated by Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy. We ask: 
‘How do I know I am really awake?’, and ‘Could the whole of reality be a dream?’
5
. 
They indeed sound sceptical because they challenge the things we take for granted in 
a broad sense. But are they such in fact? Let us look at them more closely. Descartes’ 
approach is often called methodological scepticism. He starts from putting such 
questions and doubts as mentioned above in his method of reasoning and he even 
doubts that human senses can be a source of real, justifiable knowledge, but asking 
them is not his strategic aim. He is raising them in order to find a stable and 
unshakeable base on which to build well-grounded knowledge. He points at areas 
where we can look for such certainty, finally finding certainty in his own existence (as 
I) So, the method of Descartes is sceptical, but his philosophical attitude is certainly 
not. He writes in the Meditations: 
 
The purpose of my arguments is not that they prove what they establish – that there 
really is a world and that human beings have bodies and so on – since no one has 
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As well know he finishes his pre-scientific work by constructing a very well grounded 
– as he believes – philosophical system with its famous metaphysical dualism of res 
cogitans and res extensa. There is no room for scepticism there, so one can hardly call 
Descartes a sceptic in any real sense apart from a methodological one. 
 Let’s make another long historical jump, which will let us see how the 
problem with scepticism is (not) solved in 20
th
 century philosophy. We can 
distinguish three different approaches here exemplified in the work of certain 
philosophers. I will distinguish them according to the attitudes these philosophers take 
towards different forms of scepticism: 
 
(i) Refusal to accept any form of scepticism (especially a global one) with a 
serious attempt to give a proof of the external world to show that scepticism is 
wrong (George Moore). 
(ii) Refusal to accept a global form of scepticism by showing that the very 
formulation of the idea itself is wrong and even nonsensical (Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in his later work
7
). 
(iii) Acceptance of moderate scepticism with its all consequences after careful 
consideration (Barry Stroud, Peter Strawson, Peter Unger). 
(iv) Acceptance of certain kind of scepticism precisely defined for its own 
philosophical purpose. Scepticism is treated here as the only possible 
metaphysical view which can be accepted (Thomas Nagel). 
Before I try to convince you that the fourth form of philosophical attitude towards 
scepticism is the right one, let us first have a quick look at the others. 
 Moore in his famous article Proof of an External World
8
 gives us something 
which he called ‘a perfectly rigorous proof’ of the existence of things outside. As I 
said before, global scepticism consists in, among other things, a doubt about the 
existence of external world. In other words: we can never be sure if we are dreaming 
or not, so we are not sure that the world around us really exists. Moore’s argument 
against global scepticism is very simple and let me add does not convince many 
philosophers. He assumes that a hand is a part of an external world. So, if there is a 
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part of an external world, there must be an external world itself. So, all he has to do is 
to prove that something like a hand exists, hence he will prove the existence of the 
external world as well. According to Moore in order to prove the existence of human 
hands it is enough to make a certain gesture, that of holding up our two hands. Yet, 
the problem remains. Moore has proved that the external objects (our hands) exist, but 
now he has to prove that they existed in the past. He says: 
 
I held up two hands above this desk not very long ago; therefore two hands existed 





Moore is very much aware of the fact that he cannot give a proof which would be 
something like a general statement as to how an proposition like ‘The external world 
exists’ may be proved (he does not believe such a proof can be given at all). He just 
has given a proof of the truth of some propositions concerning external things. It is 
not possible to prove that we are not dreaming, nevertheless we are very well aware 
that we are awake. This very awareness is based on faith and this seems to be enough 
to take it for granted and treat as real knowledge. There is an additional Moore’s 
argument which is supposed to make Descartes’ dreaming problem vanish. Let me 
quote what Moore calls ‘the guilty of inconsistency’: 
 
Can anybody possibly know that dreams have occurred, if, at the time, he does not 
himself know that he is not dreaming? If he is dreaming, it may be that he is only 
dreaming that dreams have occurred; and, if he does not know that he is not 
dreaming, can he possibly know that he is not only dreaming that dreams have 





Moore’s doubt is not that it is logically impossible that we are not dreaming at the 
moment, but he doubts that we could have both all sensory experiences and memories 
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 Let me say a few words about Wittgenstein’s strategy. It may be said that he 
rejects scepticism not by confronting it with a dogmatic metaphysical position, but 
rather with a different view of knowledge or obtaining knowledge. In this case 
scepticism is seen as an approach which simply cannot be formulated, for its 
formulation does not make sense. Why? Because it raises doubts where no questions 
can be asked. According to Wittgenstein, doubt and justification makes sense only 
within a certain system of rules (e.g. within certain language games) which determine 
the use of the expressions involved in them, and this is totally ignored both by 
scepticism and foundationalism. To call something ‘knowledge’ we do not need to 
treat it as unchangeable, absolute, independent from any language and immune to 
errors, as it is assumed in global scepticism. According to Strawson, Wittgenstein 
distinguishes two different kinds of elements in our belief-system:  
 
which we actually treat as a matter for inquiry or doubt – and on the other hand – 
those elements which have a quite a different character, alluded to by the figures of 




These two elements build our knowledge-belief system and even if those propositions 
which belong to the second of them could not be proved, they would remain part of 
our knowledge on which we can rely
13
. In the last two paragraphs (675 and 676) of 
On Certainty Wittgenstein is trying to show that Descartes’ dreaming-argument is 
based on certain ignorance of understanding the phrase ‘to think, to have thoughts’. 
Namely, having thoughts is necessarily connected with being awake. One cannot 
think and sleep at the same time, because the possibility of the occurrence of thoughts 
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 There are some philosophers who accept scepticism in its moderate form after 
a careful search for arguments against it. Let me take Peter Unger’s considerations as 
an illustration of such position. In his article An Argument for Scepticism
15
 he 
analyses in detail something which he calls a conclusion of universal scepticism, that 
is: ‘nobody ever knows that anything is so’. The very conclusion follows from two 
premises: 
(1) If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for the person to be 
absolutely certain that it is so. 
(2) It is never all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so
16
. 
Unger claims that the first premise cannot be denied because it would violate the 
meaning of the phrase ’to know’ and our general concept of knowledge. The 
correctness of the second premise comes from taking for granted the dogmatic feature 
that there is always something wrong with being absolutely certain
17
. To be absolutely 
certain about something entails to being not open at all to taking into account any new 
experience or relevant information which could possibly change the state of being 
certain in a given case. Unger prefers a more open-minded position, as he calls it. No 
matter how sure we can feel about our knowledge and about our philosophical theory, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that we could be possibly wrong. In Unger’s view,  




2. Nagel’s scepticism. 
I very much hope that the short and quick run-through of some positions in the 
history of scepticism has given us a good starting point to show its constructive, 
useful and true elements. I will summarise what has been said through describing 
Thomas Nagel’s scepticism, a position which seems right to me
19
. 
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 We have already seen that scepticism can be viewed as opposed to dogmatism, 
but there is another important relationship. Nagel claims that there is a certain 
relationship between scepticism and objectivism. They are both philosophical 
positions based on the idea that we belong to a real world and that all phenomena are 
created because of interactions between us and objects in the world. It means that we 
cannot accept phenomena in a non-critical way and we have to try to understand how 
we ourselves take part in creating them. In a way we cannot run away from ourselves. 
We cannot obtain a neutral position to investigate reality, so we have to doubt if we 
are getting closer to reality at all. We are supposed to build the conception of reality to 
which we belong, so it can be difficult (if at all possible) to include the conception of 
a subject (us) creating (in a sense) the reality in question. This very problem of 
achieving only a subjective ground for our knowledge can be, according to Nagel, 
faced with three types of reactions: sceptical, reductive and heroic
20
. The first and the 
last are of interest here. As we already know there is unbridgeable gap between truth 
conditions of our beliefs and verification conditions of our beliefs, as that they cannot 
be defended against serious doubts. If follows that they cannot treated in a serious, 
rational way. Heroic theories admit that there is the same abyss between the content of 
our beliefs about the world and their justification, but we can nevertheless jump over 
it. Such theories were stated by Plato, Descartes, Moore and many others to defend 
metaphysical realism. Nagel also wants to defend realism, but it seems to him that 
sceptical reaction is the correct one especially when we take our epistemological 
limits into account
21
. We should admit that our epistemological commitments are 
temporal and that we are not able to ‘run away’ from ourselves, but we should rather 
re-define our notion of knowledge. In looking for objective knowledge we can be 
always confronted with sceptical doubts which we are not able to refute. We cannot 
exclude the possibility that the world is totally different from the way it appears to us, 
but there is no way which could convince us that this is the case. We can and should 
try to achieve a complete conception of the world in which certain creatures capable 
of having a concept of the world really exist. Such a complete conception should 
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explain how such creatures were able to form it. But still, such a self-transcendent 
theory would present just a possible view of the world and would not be immune to 
sceptical doubts. It would rather be a theory which could be true. Scepticism, as Nagel 
sees it, is the way of becoming aware of these facts, but is still does not force us to be 
happy with a merely subjective picture of the world. 
 
3. Basic elements of Horwich’s theory of truth
22
. 
 Scepticism in its all forms is connected with an idea that when we want to 
achieve knowledge, we want to achieve real knowledge, in the old episteme sense of 
it. The connection is such that the sceptic doubts if such knowledge can be achieved 
because (among other things) a lack of absolute answers to the unavoidable question 
about the relationship between beliefs (propositions
23
) – which build our 
epistemological system – and the world. In other words, what makes beliefs 
(propositions) true. If the answer is that it is the world which makes them such, we 
still have to say how can we recognise that it does so (the problem of criteria). We are 
faced here with an old problem of formulating a theory of truth. I invite you to have a 
look at Horwich’s minimal proposal concerning truth. 
 I find his theory a good example of a sceptical approach (in the moderate and 
Nagelian sense) for a number of reasons. Firstly, Horwich shares the following claim 
with other deflationists: 
 
that the concept of truth is not metaphysically deep and does not require appeal to 





It prevents him from accepting certain dogmatic metaphysical  views, which by 
definition have to result in certainty in case of knowledge. Deflationism treats the 
notion of truth in a more moderate sense. Secondly, he illustrates how the truth 
predicate works using a very simple equivalence schema, without adding any 
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substantial claims to it. This schema shows that the truth predicate is not especially 
complex. Let me make this schema a bit more familiar to you.  
Horwich underlines the fact that no matter which theory of truth we - as 
philosophers - defend, we are ready to infer from the expression A: ‘Snow is white’, 
the expression B: ‘The proposition that snow is white is true’. So observing how our 
language works we can make the following claim: 
 
<Snow is white> is true iff snow is white 
 
Similar claims will be valid for an endless class of propositions, so we can generalise 
and we obtain: 
 
T-schema <p> is true iff p 
 
The simplicity (or even triviality) of the schema shows that the aim of Horwich’s 
deflationism is not to give an answer to the general and substantial question What is 
truth? because we should not change our schema into an inflationistic schema of the 
form: 
 
I-schema x is true iff x is Q 
 
Why not? Because it will always result with some metaphysically committed theories 
of truth and their problems, which will be impossible to solve. What is more with the 
I-schema we would have to define a truth-predicate employing some other expression 
(Q) with the same meaning and with special explanatory power which would leave 
(Q) unable to explain how x can be true. According to Horwich, we apply the truth-
predicate according to the T-schema and in view of our epistemological limits we 
cannot decide what is that very something which makes a proposition true in every 
particular case. There is no such single thing or rather there are different things in a 
different cases which do so. It can be said that in minimal theories of truth it is not 
denied that in a sense truth corresponds to reality. When a certain proposition is true, 
it is such because of something in reality; something which is external to that 
proposition. Now, how we treat reality, how we understand the expressions which 
build that proposition and how we recognise that correspondence is accomplished are 
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all very complicated matters. A minimal theory of truth of Horwich’s type is not 
going to answer them on its own grounds. The matter is closely connected with our 
epistemological capacities which are limited and open to errors. The last claim, as you 
may recognise, is compatible with Nagel’s scepticism. There are claims which can be 
treated as quite solid grounds of our knowledge, grounds on which our knowledge is 
built (e.g. T-schema), but all the rest can only be obtained in a long and difficult 
search for objective knowledge; objective in Wittgenstein’s or Nagel’s sense, nor 
Plato’s or Descartes’ sense.  
 Following just these basic theses of minimal theory of truth. one can easily see 
that, as a theory, minimalism is open to a certain kind of epistemological pluralism. 
And pluralism is always seen as opposed to dogmatism and to metaphysically 
substantial views, and as such is of course on scepticism’s side. 
